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Essay
Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy
Relationship
Jack M. Balkin* and Sanford Levinson"
I. INTRODUCTION: IS LAW PART OF THE HUMANITIES?
A TALE OF Two SPEECHES'
In 1930, Judge Learned Hand, widely regarded as one of the most
distinguished judges in our nation's history, spoke to the Juristic Society
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. In his address, "Sources of
Tolerance," he told his listeners
I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to
* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School.
** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood., Jr., Centennial Chair in Law, and Professor
of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
1. We originally wrote this essay for a project sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences on the current state of the humanities. Other essays written for the project considered the
state of contemporary history, philosophy, comparative literature, African-American studies, and
English literature. All were recently published, including a shorter version of this essay, in Daedalus.
See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law & the Humanities, Spring 2006 Df DALUS 105 (2006).
We thought it appropriate to focus on whether law merited a place in such a project; that is, what, if
anything, made law one of the "humanities" in the twenty-first century.
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pass on a question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing
acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon,
and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with
Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and
Kant, as with the books which have been specifically written on the
subject.2
Hand's remarks assume three points that form the central focus of this
essay. The first is that the study of law is either part of or is strongly
connected to the humanities. The second is that the lawyer or legal scholar
called upon to discuss and analyze legal questions cannot do so by looking
merely within the confines of traditional legal materials: cases, statutes,
and "books which have been specifically written on the subject" of law.
Instead, he or she needs assistance and edification from other sources. The
third is that those external sources of knowledge are to be found not in the
natural sciences or the social sciences, but in subjects that we customarily
call "the humanities."
Hand is not merely assuming these things. He also presents himself to us
as a wise jurist who has been influenced by the "great books" he has
selected for our attention. Because he is himself familiar with each of the
writers he mentions, he enjoys membership in a "republic of letters," the
sort of membership that is necessary for anyone who wishes to "live
greatly in the law."3 There was nothing particularly unusual about these
assumptions in the early twentieth century, particularly coming from an
elite member of the legal profession like Hand. Moreover, membership in
the American republics of law and letters had run both ways. Robert
Ferguson's important book, Law and Letters in American Culture,
discusses the many late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century
American writers who had been trained as lawyers (and in many instances,
had actually practiced law), including Charles Brockden Brown, Hugh
Henry Brackenridge, Washington Irving, William Bryant, and James
Fenimore Cooper.4 One might also think of Hand's contemporary, the
Harvard Law School-educated poet Archibald McLeish, or, closer to our
own time, writers ranging from Louis Auchincloss to Scott Turow and
John Grisham.
Nonetheless, few legal scholars today share Hand's assumptions;
indeed, these assumptions were already under attack at the turn of the
twentieth century. Consider what is perhaps the most important single
2. LEARNED HAND, THE SPRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 81
(1951).
3. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Profession of the Law: Conclusion of a Lecture Delivered to
Undergraduates of Harvard University on February 17, 1886, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, 29, 30
(1921).
4. ROBERT FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984); see also MICHAEL
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lecture in the history of American law: "The Path of the Law," 5 delivered
by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who had taught briefly at Harvard Law
School before fleeing to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Speaking in June 1897 before the students and faculty of the Boston
University School of Law, Holmes predicted that "[flor the rational study
of the law the black-letter man [i.e., the master of legal case law] may be
the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics
and the master of economics."6
Holmes and Hand were friends, but they clearly disagreed about the
future direction (or path) of the law. While Hand advocated the study of
the humanities, Holmes advocated the study of the social sciences,
particularly economics. Although Hand made his remarks a generation
after Holmes's, his vision of interdisciplinarity was in some ways an older
one that saw a career in the law as continuous with membership in a
republic of letters. From the vantage point of a full century after Holmes's
address and seventy-five years following Hand's, one can confidently
state, whether regretfully or not, that Hand's assumptions-that law is
centrally located in the humanities, and is not complete unless it draws
nourishment from them-no longer seem so obvious.
One reason may lie in the development of the American college
curriculum after World War II, when colleges and universities were
transformed from bastions of the upper classes to venues where middle
class students-and even occasional members of the lower classes-could
seek an education that previously was rarely accessible to them. One could
no longer assume that law school matriculants had studied the Iliad and
the Odyssey in English, let alone in the original Greek.
A second reason is the change in the structure of what is today aptly
called the "legal services industry." Although there certainly continue to
be substantial numbers of small-town general practitioners, "boutique"
firms, prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers, legal academics, and the
like, it is hard to gainsay that the dominant role in this industry is played
by ever-larger law firms, many of them multinational in organization, that
operate like great knowledge- (or rhetoric-) production factories.7 These
firms have increasingly complicated links to other fields like finance and
accounting. Lawyers have become key players in an ever-expanding
globalizing technocracy; and contemporary law schools (especially at the
5. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
6. Id. at 469.
7. Consider the opening sentence of Alison Frankel, Growing Pains, THE AMERICAN LAWYER,
May 1, 2006, at 94: "Since 1986, when The American Lawyer first published a list of the 100 highest-
grossing firms in the United States, the total number of lawyers in The Am Law 100 has almost
tripled. In 1986, it numbered 25,994. In 2005, it reached 70,161." Of all American lawyers
(approximately 1,086,500 in 2004), over six percent are employed by one of these firms. Frankel
immediately goes on to note that the average profits per partner in these hundred firms were in excess
of one million dollars. Eleven U.S.-based law firms now have over one thousand members. See The A-
List, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Sept. 1, 2005, at 106.
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elite level), eager to provide a steady stream of cogs for this great
machine, have turned not to comparative literature but to economics and
rational-actor methodologies. The student at an elite law school today is
more likely to be acquainted with Ronald Coase's Theory of the Firm than
with Plato's Theory of the Forms,8 with agency costs than with Acton, and
with rent-seeking than with Rabelais.
Is it therefore only a play on words to call law "a humane profession" in
a way that is different from, say, medicine? Nothing, after all, could be
more humane than trying to relieve the suffering of one's fellow human
beings, but most of us would properly associate medicine more with the
sciences than the humanities. Has Holmes so completely won out over
Hand that it makes little sense to think of the study of law in the same
category as, say, philosophy or literary criticism?
To answer this question one must consider the sea change in
professional self-consciousness that has occurred between the time when
Hand spoke and the present. Part of this change involves the very meaning
of what it is to be a professional lawyer and, therefore, what lawyers do
and what count as the relevant materials of study, both for those who learn
in law schools and for those who teach in them. We emphasize the term
"professional" for good reason: One can certainly study law without
becoming a practicing lawyer. But one cannot, at least in the United
States, become a lawyer without going through the particular discipline of
a law school.
What does (or should) constitute that "discipline" is a central (and much
disputed) question. In fact, it encompasses three related questions. The
first is whether the canon of standard-form legal materials is sufficient to
do good work in law. Although Hand was one of the consummate
professional judges of his era, he nonetheless seems to suggest to his
audience that studying only standard-form legal materials is a mistake.
Indeed, one might even infer from Hand's pronouncement (though we
doubt that this was his intent) that one might not need to be a lawyer at all
in order to have cogent, well-formed opinions about what the law is or
should be. Holmes, too, had his doubts about studying only standard-form
legal materials, particularly when a knowledge of statistics and economics
might produce better legal decisions.
The second question is whether law is a genuine "discipline," with its
own distinctive methodologies and standards of argument and proof; or is
law, on the contrary, merely a "subject matter"-similar, say, to the city of
8. In fact, a study by Yale Law School librarian Fred Shapiro discovered that Ronald Coase's
classic article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960), was the single most-heavily
cited article by legal academics. Fred Shapiro, The Most Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 751 (1996). Whether citation counts should constitute proof of scholarly influence is a
controversial question on which our somewhat irreverent analysis of Shapiro's study touches, Jack
Balkin and Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 843
(1996). Nevertheless, Coase's placement at the top of the list it is an apt symbol of the influence that
the law and economics movement maintains in the contemporary legal academy.
[Vol. 18:155
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New York or the nineteenth-century settlement of the American
Midwest-that can be approached in any number of ways? If the latter,
then there is nothing necessarily distinctive, at least from a purely
methodological perspective, about being a lawyer or having received
professional legal training.
The debate over whether law is a distinctive discipline or a mere subject
matter (or, in contemporary parlance, a form of area studies) is quite old.
Recall the famous dispute between King James I and Lord Coke. James,
King of England and Scotland by divine right, claimed the right to
interpret the law on the basis of his own reason. Coke would have none of
this. Legal questions, he insisted, must be resolved through the "the
artificial reason" of the law, something quite different from the teachings
of "natural reason."9 Only legal adepts were authorized or competent to
engage in this special form of investigation.
For obvious reasons, few lawyers have ever wholly rejected the notion
that law is a distinctive methodology as well as a subject matter. To do so,
after all, would remove any rationale for the de facto institutional
monopoly that lawyers enjoy in trying cases and representing clients for
large sums of money. Lawyers' demands for professional legal skill is
most insistent with respect to staffing the judiciary, especially at its
highest levels where, ironically, the questions posed are most freighted
with social and political consequence and where legalist algorithms are
least helpful and least determinate.
The third question is whether law is a "science," defined by reference to
distinctively disciplinary procedures and norms, as with other sciences, or
something else, perhaps the "art of governance," whose study would be
much closer to the humanities than to either the natural or the social
sciences.' 0
The modern American legal academy begins in 1870 with the
appointment of Christopher Columbus Langdell as Dean of the Harvard
Law School. Langdell's avowed mission was to transform American legal
education into "scientific analysis," and he had been appointed to the
deanship by Harvard President Charles Eliot, himself a scientist. For
Langdell, "legal science" consisted, principally, of the art of reading a
relatively closed set of materials found in libraries: the decisions of
9. EDWARD COKE, 12 REPORTS 63, 65 (4th ed. 1738), reprinted in 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343
(1907). See W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 429-31 (2d ed. 1937); Charles Fried,
The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 30, 39-40 n. 15, 57
(1981); see also Allen Dillard Boyer, "Understanding, Authority, and Will": Sir Edward Coke and the
Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REV. 43, 58 (1997) (discussing the claim that law
represents the understandings of the legal community).
10. Consider that the British Empire drew many of its administrators and leaders from those who
had studied classics and history at Oxford and Cambridge, presumably on the grounds that this
training developed a necessary capacity for civilized "judgment." C. J. Dewey, The Education of a
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judges, particularly those at the appellate level."' From these decisions the
legal scientist would then discern, through the power of legal analysis, the
structures of overarching doctrine that could unite such seemingly
disparate topics as the sale of potatoes and the sale of slaves into one
subject matter called "contracts." We do not know how well-read Langdell
was, but we are fairly confident that he would have looked askance at a
student (or a Harvard law school professor) who thought that it was more
important to immerse oneself in Dante or Shakespeare than in the case law
generated by courts. It would be as if a paleontologist preferred reading
Aristotle to carefully assessing the fossil record.
Ever since Langdell, the standard psychodrama of American legal
education has revolved around the recurrent slaying of the Langdellian
beast in the name of humanism, social science, or some other form of
interdisciplinarity, only to be followed by the phoenix-like resurrection of
elements of Langdell's original program of analyzing legal materials and
cases (albeit now suitably leavened by a sprinkling of non-legal sources).
Still, only the most foolhardy academic today would describe doctrinal
analysis as "scientific." The preferred term today is "craft," which
continues to be used as an evaluative term, especially by those educated at
the Harvard Law School." (And by legal craft, few mean the ability to
weave in references to Homer, Hume, or Rabelais.) As we shall see,
however, the highly influential law-and-economics movement, which has
made steady inroads into the American academy since the early 1970s, is
not at all averse to emphasizing the scientific status of economics to
justify its own claims to authority. And so the drama continues.
11. As Landgell explained:
If law be a science, it will scarcely be disputed that it is one of the greatest and most difficult of
the sciences and that it needs all the light that the most enlightened seat of learning can throw
upon it. Again, law can be learned and taught in a university by means of printed books .... If
printed books are the ultimate source of all legal knowledge; if every student who would obtain
any mastery of law as a science must resort to these ultimate sources; and if the only assistance
which it is possible for the learner to receive is such as can be afforded by teachers who have
travelled the same road before him,-then a university, and a university alone, can furnish every
possible facility for teaching and learning law .... We have also constantly inculcated the idea
that the library is the proper workshop of professors and students alike; that it is to us all that the
laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, all that the museums of natural
history is to the zoologists, all that the botanical garden is to the botanists.
Christopher Columbus Langdell, Preface to the First Edition, in CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS
LANGDELL, A SELECTION ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1879). See also id. at viii (explaining
the purpose of the selection of cases). As Professor Hans Badde has pointed out in conversation with
Levinson, Langdell's original casebook on contracts included more cases drawn from the United
Kingdom than from the United States.
12. On Harvard Law School and the "craft" tradition, see, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, 219 (1986); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 78 (1978); Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in
American Jurispurdence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 635 (1993); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
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II. INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM
Our previous discussion posed three questions: whether law is sufficient
to itself or needs help from outside sources; whether law is a discipline or
merely a form of area studies; and whether legal reasoning is a distinct
science or is continuous with-and therefore might appropriately be
nourished by-knowledge and skills from other areas of study. Each
question suggests a basic divide between an "internalist" and an
"externalist" approach to law and legal education. Each of these
approaches can, in turn, be further divided into two basic issues. First,
what methods, skills, and forms of knowledge are necessary or appropriate
for arguing, analyzing, discussing, and deciding legal questions? Are these
methods wholly internal to law or do they come from outside it? This is
the question of the disciplinary canon. Second, what attitude should a
student or scholar of the law have about the subject? Must the student or
scholar be a participant who understands herself as furthering the aims and
purposes of the enterprise of law, or should she take the (relatively)
detached attitude of a social scientist studying a social phenomenon from
the outside? This is the question of disciplinary attitude.
Although we have used the term "legal questions" in both of these
formulations, what counts as a "legal question" from an internal
perspective may be quite different from what qualifies as a "legal
question" from an external perspective. The former might include
questions about the best interpretation of the phrase "prior to December
31st" in federal legislation regarding mining claims 13 or of the word
"torture" in a number of federal statutes and international conventions.1 4
The latter might include questions like "Why did tort law change during
the Industrial Revolution?" or "Why do so many corporations prefer
Delaware law?"
An internalist approach to the disciplinary canon makes two claims.
First, there is a set of arguments, approaches, skills, and forms of
knowledge distinctive to law that one must master to discuss law
competently, interpret legal documents, and resolve legal disputes.
Second, these distinctive skills are more or less sufficient to decide legal
questions. Until quite recently, the internalist view has been the traditional
perspective of the American law school, whose faculty have tended to
view themselves as judges manqu6 who (consciously or unconsciously)
invite their students to play the role of the judge in talking and arguing
about law.
An externalist approach to the disciplinary canon, by contrast, argues
that discussions of law are incomplete without knowledge and skills from
other disciplines, including, most prominently, the natural sciences, social
13. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
14. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, In Quest of a 'Common Conscience': Reflections on the Current
Debate About Torture, I J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL. 231 (2005).
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sciences, and the humanities. The moderate version of the externalist
position is that all of these are necessary supplements to a serious study of
law; a more extreme version would contend that they are sufficient, and
that the "artificial reason of the law" that Coke celebrated obfuscates what
is really going on in legal decisionmaking. For the radical externalist, legal
decisionmaking is just a special form of ordinary political or moral
decisionmaking, and hence it will be better performed to the extent that it
can make use of those forms of knowledge that assist people in making
political and moral decisions.
A parallel dispute occurs over the appropriate disciplinary attitude one
should have about the enterprise of law. For the intemalist, the very point
of studying law is to further the enterprise of deciding legal cases and
justifying legal doctrines. This may be done at a very concrete level of
doctrinal synthesis or at the most abstract levels of legal theory. In both
cases, however, the goal is to move the enterprise of law forward. An
intemalist attitude toward law identifies with law and with its aims. It may
hope to make law more rational, more coherent, or more just; it may seek
to offer the most persuasive interpretation of the law or of a legal
document in order to further the interests of a client; or it may simply be
devoted to explaining what the law is and insisting that the law be obeyed
because it is the law.
An externalist attitude, by contrast, studies law as a social phenomenon,
much as an anthropologist might study the ancient beliefs of the Mayan
religion without adhering to them. One may need to think about law from
the internalist perspective to understand how it operates, but the point of
this understanding is not to further the enterprise but to understand its
history and social effects. An externalist does not ask "what is the best
interpretation of this legal document?" or even "how can I manufacture
arguments that will persuade a judge to decide in favor of my client?"
Rather, one might study questions such as who claims the ability to
interpret; what are the political and social backgrounds of adjudicators
(and what is the connection between these backgrounds and the decisions
they make); who actually benefits or loses from given decisions; how do
social movements organize themselves around certain kinds of legal
claims and influence legal decisionmaking; and finally, does legal
decisionmaking have more or less effect on the real world than lawyers
and judges think it has. Such questions tend to be the focus of social
scientists who study law. In like fashion, literary critics might be
interested in the rhetorical operations of law; historians might be
interested in the development of law in its social and political context, and
so on.
The division between intemalist and externalist attitudes about law is
analogous, in some respects, to the question whether a law school is more
like a divinity school, on the one hand, or a department of religion on the
other. Although there may be atheists in seminaries studying theology and
[Vol. 18:155
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true believers in departments of religion, the general distinction between
these departments seems clear: to participate in the intellectual life of the
seminary is, with very rare exceptions, to promote faith and the working
out of the beliefs and values of a particular religion to which one is
devoted; a department of religion, by contrast, implies no necessary
requirement that those who teach or those who learn believe in the
religions they study or work on their behalf. The goal is rather to study the
social, historical, political, and economic features of religion(s).
To the extent that law school is like a school of divinity, law professors
believe in the enterprise of law (including those suspensions of disbelief
necessary to separate what is deemed "law" from what is deemed
"politics"). Many will practice law or give legal advice to others, and all
will seek to inculcate in their students the techniques of arguing to legal
decisionmakers who are also internal to that enterprise. However, to the
extent that law schools are "departments of law," law professors need not
practice law and may not particularly care whether one case or another is
rightly decided from an internal perspective. Rather, their goal is to study
law as a literary, cultural, economic, or social phenomenon. If, on
occasion, they make arguments about what the law should be, their
reasoning will be largely from the standpoint of what would be good
policy as distinct from what the law commands or requires.
Taking these distinctions together, we can see that there are four basic
combinations of internal and external views about disciplinary canon and
disciplinary attitude:
Use materials and skills Use materials and skills
internal to the external to the traditional
traditional practice of practice of law to study
law to study and decide and decide "legal
"legal questions" questions"
Internalist attitude
about the enterprise 2
of law
Externalist attitude
about the enterprise 4 3
of law
At the risk of exaggeration, we might say that the history of the American
legal academy in the twentieth century has been a continuous flight from
Box I to Box 2 with occasional forays into Box 3. That is especially so if
we may regard Langdellianism as the epitome of Box 1-a strong belief
that the point of legal study is to further the professional values of law
coupled with an equally strong belief in an internalist legal "science" both
necessary and sufficient to correctly analyze and resolve legal questions.
Balkin & Levinson
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American legal scholars have reacted to Langdell's efforts in one of two
ways. They have maintained the ultimate aim of promoting professional
goals while bringing ever new interdisciplinary tools to bear to achieve
those goals (Box 2); or, dissatisfied with the intellectual strictures
necessary to maintain the internalist attitude, they have sought to study
law as a social, cultural, political, historical, literary, religious, or
economic phenomenon, using whatever disciplinary resources they
believed were most appropriate to the task (Box 3).
Box 4, an externalist attitude to the study of law that insists on using
only materials internal to the traditional enterprise of law to do its work,
has been relatively infrequent in the American legal academy. The reason
is not difficult to imagine. Once one abandons the notion that one must
look at law from the perspective of lawyers, judges, and legal
practitioners, the gravitational pull of other disciplines is difficult to resist.
Nevertheless, a lawyer or legal philosopher influenced by Wittgenstein
might conclude that if law is its own distinctive form of social life, the
only way to truly engage in legal discourse is to immerse oneself in its
characteristic forms and practices. In this case, one would cycle back
around to Box 1. This is, in fact, the view of a number of legal scholars.' 5
The turn to interdisciplinarity, we should point out, has been largely an
American invention-only now are significant numbers of legal scholars
in other countries, no doubt influenced by American scholarship,
becoming interested in interdisciplinary research agendas. Formalist
tendencies in other countries, particularly Europe and Latin America,
remain quite strong, much to the consternation of Americans.
Nevertheless, in hindsight, the turn to other disciplines in American legal
scholarship seems inevitable. Americans are pragmatists, and love the
authority of science. The very claim that law is sufficient to itself flies in
the face of the fact that the most familiar modalities of legal reasoning
often seem to call upon knowledge that other disciplines might easily
provide. For example, arguments about which legal rule would have better
consequences are legion in legal reasoning. Surely they might be enriched
by work from a wide variety of social science disciplines, including, most
prominently, economics and sociology. Arguments from constitutional
structure could gain from the learning of political scientists, while
arguments about how best to interpret ambiguous texts might benefit from
the work of public choice theorists as well as students of literary theory.
Not surprisingly, legal scholars in the past fifty years have turned to all of
these fields, and others as well.
Then too, American lawyers continually make arguments about
legislative and constitutional history, particularly when appealing to the
understandings of the founding generation. To reject the importance of
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specialized training in history would be to suggest, in effect, that "anyone
can do history," that there is no distinctive methodology (or set of
methodologies) that require years of disciplinary training. American
lawyers pride themselves particularly on their versatility and ability to
absorb facts quickly, and so legal scholars have often convinced
themselves that the work of other disciplines holds no terrors for them.
Mark Tushnet, a recent president of the American Association of Law
Schools, once referred derisively to what he called "the lawyer as
astrophysicist"' 'the notion (or fantasy) that a clever lawyer, armed only
with a J.D., could, over the weekend, become sufficiently competent in the
literature of astrophysicists to engage in professional-level conversations
(or cross-examinations) of those who have spent their lives in the field.
There is a technical term for this particular attitude of lawyers: chutzpah.
We jest only a bit. Consider that neither of the two most prominent
"originalists" on the United States Supreme Court-Justices Scalia and
Thomas-has any professional training as historians, but that has not
stopped them from criticizing their colleagues and others for failing to
abide by what the framers meant. Conversely, most academics with joint
degrees in history and law tend to be highly skeptical of the claims
asserted by the most stringent "originalists," not least because of the fact
that most trained historians are considerably more nuanced in their
conclusions about the meaning of past events than are originalist lawyers.
Indeed, a familiar criticism of lawyers, whether or not they are
originalists, is that they engage all too often in what is called "law-office
history"-mining the historical record to support their favored legal
conclusions.
Thus, we can see that a lawyer's native sense of overconfidence
produces two different and opposite effects. On the one hand, lawyers in
the past rejected the work of other disciplines because they believed they
could do everything themselves. On the other hand, legal scholars today
embrace other disciplines, but their interdisciplinary work may be shallow
because, once again, they think they can pick it up with comparatively
little effort. Tushnet's quip about "the lawyer as astrophysicist" was not
directed at lawyers who rejected interdisciplinary scholarship, but at those
who too eagerly embraced it. However, we note that the shallowness of
legal interdisciplinarity is receding somewhat as more and more
J.D.iPh.D.'s enter the teaching profession, and as the field becomes
increasingly sophisticated in its aims and approaches.
The clockwise progression from Box I to Boxes 2 and 3, however, is
simply a general tendency, and oversimplifies a much more complicated
story. In fact, a powerful gravitational force continually pulls the straying
legal academic back in a counterclockwise direction: toward an internal
16. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Scholarship: What Next?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 28, 31
(1988); Mark V. Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law
Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX L. REV. 1307, 1338 n. 140 (1979).
2006]
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attitude about the point of legal study as well as toward the traditional
materials of legal practice. That gravitational force is professionalism-
the fact that, unlike most other members of the humanities, legal scholars
teach in professional schools designed to turn out practicing lawyers who
are thoroughly enmeshed in the enterprise of law and who must be trained
to make traditional legal arguments about traditional legal materials before
judges and other legal decision-makers. Although it is safe to say that an
increasing number of legal academics inhabit Box 2 today-and that new
hires are increasingly expected to bring interdisciplinary skills to their
scholarship if they wish to receive tenure-there are very strong pressures
to keep them from moving to Box 3 and making a permanent home there.
In this respect, law schools still have much more in common with divinity
schools than departments of religion.
III. THE RISE OF INTERDISCIPLINARY LEGAL STUDIES
Interdisciplinary legal studies is the result of a long and slow process
that occurred in fits and starts throughout the twentieth century, though it
was surely heralded in Holmes's "The Path of the Law."' 7 Stated in terms
of the diagram above, Holmes was urging lawyers to move from Box 1 to
Box 2 as fast as their legs could carry them. Hewing to traditional
practices of legal argument was outmoded, Holmes insisted. "It is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV.' 8 In particular, he suggested, "every
lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics."' 9
In stark contrast to Learned Hand's vision of law as part of a noble
republic of letters, Holmes offered a vision of interdisciplinarity that
sought to discard all forms of humanist sentimentality. Law was a
"business," Holmes insisted, in which "people . . .pay lawyers to argue
for them," and "predict[] ... the incidence of the public force through the
instrumentality of the courts. '20 In one of the most famous passages in
"The Path of the Law," Holmes argues that to understand law one must
view it from the perspective of the "bad man,"'2' who wants the lawyer's
assistance only insofar as it will help him to achieve his selfish ends,
regardless of the consequences for justice or the greater good of society.
The lawyer's task, Holmes argues, is advising such "bad men" and helping
them to achieve their ends within the parameters of legal doctrine. Law,
Holmes, insisted, was too easily confused with morality, and Holmes
17. Holmes, supra note 5, at 457.
18. Id.
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speculated "whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral
significance could be banished from the law altogether.,
22
While Hand welcomed the edifying influence of the humanities, Holmes
strove to make law more scientific and even industrial. Consider that
Hand's list of great books included not a single economist-not even
Adam Smith-and that Holmes's imagined alternative to black-letter law
was "statistics." Holmes's prediction came true, but only in part.
Economics has indeed become the most successful disciplinary invasion
into legal studies, although "the man of statistics" has not yet entirely
displaced "the black-letter man." Rather, the embrace of economics and
other disciplines has created a continuing tension-and in a few
institutions, outright warfare-about the nature and future of legal
education. Nevertheless, Holmes might well be pleased by recent trends in
law-school hiring. Although most law professors are still hired with only a
J.D. degree, a steadily increasing proportion of new hires hold Ph.D.'s in
other disciplines, particularly in history, philosophy, and economics. Very
soon, if not already, a Ph.D. in economics will become a necessity for
those seeking to do cutting edge law-and-economics work in fields such as
antitrust and corporate law at the most prestigious law schools. No doubt
we will see increasing numbers of legal historians and legal philosophers
with doctorates in history and philosophy.
Many factors contributed to law's increasingly interdisciplinary focus.
First, American universities produced a glut of Ph.D.'s in the 1960s and
1970s, and some of these students gravitated to law schools, and
eventually to the legal academy, bringing their training and
interdisciplinary perspectives with them. Foundations like the Russell
Sage Foundation actively promoted using the social sciences to study
law. 23 Second, the civil rights movement and the second wave of
American feminism opened doors for a generation of women and
minorities, who began to enter the law schools in far greater numbers in
the 1970s and 1980s. Slowly but surely, women and minorities entered the
ranks of the legal academy, bringing new approaches with them, as well as
new additions to the legal canon. To critique existing legal arrangements,
legal feminism, critical race theory, and gay legal studies drew heavily
22. Id. at 464. For further reflections on this point, see Sanford Levinson and J. M. Balkin, The
"'Bad Man, " the Good, and the Self-Reliant, 78 BOSTON U. L. REV. 885 (1998).
23. One of us (Levinson) went to the Stanford Law School in 1970 courtesy of a Russell Sage
grant after obtaining a Ph.D in political science from Harvard. Given that the grant was for only two
years, however, one might doubt that the Foundation actually intended to encourage recipients to
become lawyers, much less that they should migrate to the legal academy from social science
departments. That being said, not only does Levinson have a joint appointment in the Government
Department at the University of Texas, but his recent work is returning to his original roots as a
political scientist. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006) (critique of
structural features of the Constitution that are rarely considered in the legal academy); David Law and
Sanford Levinson, Why Nuclear Disarmament May be Easier to Achieve than an End to Partisan
Conflict over Judicial Appointments, 39 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 923 (2005) (game theoretic analysis
of congressional conflict over judicial appointments).
2006]
13
Balkin and Levinson: Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
from other disciplines, particularly from the humanities. Law professors
like Patricia Williams and Derrick Bell deliberately merged their legal
scholarship with literary models, while other feminist and critical race
theory scholars experimented with narratives as a method of social and
legal criticism.24 The law and literature movement that we will discuss
later in this essay overlapped with the new emphasis on race, gender, and
sexual orientation studies in law schools.
Third, and perhaps most important, the interdisciplinary invasion that
began in the 1960s and 1970s resulted from long term trends in American
governance that began far earlier with the rise of the regulatory and
administrative state in the early twentieth century. Classical legal forms
proved inadequate to comprehend the increasingly complex realities of
governance. It is not simply that one lost faith in the ability of judges,
using traditional modes of legal reasoning, to make judgments about the
panoply of issues that daily present themselves to courts, legislatures, and
administrative agencies. One also lost faith in a certain form of the
enterprise of legislation, in which a parliamentary body (i.e., Congress)
would, after due deliberation, come to some sort of decision, reflected in
explicit legislation, about a matter of social controversy.
Instead, at least since the New Deal, Congress has more and more
frequently passed legislation demanding that administrative agencies make
their own decisions "in the public interest" or to safeguard "the public
health." Standard-form legal analysis provides almost no guidance in
deciding what constitutes "the public interest." As courts in the twentieth
century were delegated (or took on for themselves, depending on one's
preferred version of the story) increasingly complicated issues of
governance, their work began to merge with the work of forming and
implementing public policy. The revolution in consumer protection law
that began mid-century25 and the rights revolution symbolized by the 1954
decision in Brown v. Board of Education26 are only two examples. Indeed,
more emblematic than Brown, in many ways, was the Supreme Court's
1955 follow-up decision, Brown II, in which the Court announced that the
judiciary would be required to implement the original ruling "with all
24. PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); DERRICK BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado, ed.,1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl& Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist
Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School", 38
J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988).
25. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962); Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfeld
Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960). For a brief history, see George L. Priest, The
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985); Robert L. Rabin, Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of Products
Liability, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 197 (1997); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible
End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992).
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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deliberate speed." 27 This meant, as a practical matter, that courts would
accept long-term responsibility for designing and monitoring remedies for
the constitutional violations and social ills they had identified. In the
words of Owen Fiss, the country and the courts had entered the era of the
"structural injunction" in which courts might supervise diverse features of
social life ranging from police departments and mental hospitals to
workplaces, school districts, and prisons. 28 Courts were no longer
insulated oracles of eternal legal verities. Like legislatures and
administrative agencies, they were widely seen, for good and for ill, as
agents of social transformation and promoters of social policies.
These realities had vast jurisprudential consequences. The basic trend in
twentieth century legal studies, at least in the United States, has been a
rejection of what legal scholars dismissively called "formalism."
Formalism itself is a rather nebulous concept; sometimes one feels that it
stands for whatever things the speaker thinks are wrong with the study and
practice of law. 29 In fact, to the extent that formalism means belief in the
importance of rules to organize conduct, belief in formalism has never
departed the legal academy; indeed, it is more popular than ever.3° What
American legal scholars rejected during the twentieth century was not
rules or rule application, but two assumptions about legal thinking: (1) the
belief that the sole job of the legal mind is to work out the correct solution
to legal problems through the law's materials and internal logic, and (2)
the correlative belief that the internal logic of those materials, and not any
forms of knowledge outside them, determines whether a legal argument is
good or bad. Twentieth-century legal theory in the United States
repeatedly rejected this type of internalism in favor of realism, on the one
hand, and proceduralism, on the other.
Realism refers to the themes generally associated with the American
legal realist movement-that (1) legal actors do not and can not make
decisions wholly free from their ideological beliefs and attitudes; (2) legal
reasoning has much in common with political reasoning and policy
argument; (3) judges inevitably draw upon a wide variety of non-legal
norms to decide concrete cases; and (4) lawyers, judges, and legal scholars
should try to make law responsive to facts about the world, to the insights
of other disciplines, and, above all, to changes in society as a whole. Such
attitudes lead fairly quickly to interdisciplinarity, and many of the original
legal realists avidly embraced social science in the 1930s and 1940s in the
27. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
28. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court October 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979); see also EDWIN L. RUBIN AND MALCOLM M. FEELEY, JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998).
29. See Robert Gordon's imaginative list of different accounts of formalism and the reasons why
people were opposed to them in Robert W. Gordon, The Elusive Transformation, 6 YALE J.L. &
HUMANITIES 137, 154-57 (1994) (reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992)).
30. See, e.g., Fredrick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
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hope that it would help them solve important questions of legal
administration. Nevertheless the legal realists made only limited progress
during those early years due to a combination of factors: the difficulty of
getting funding for social science studies, the rudimentary nature of social
science in the United States, and the fact that the early realists, who had
been trained as traditional doctrinal lawyers, were not particularly good at
doing social science.3 As it has developed over the years, American legal
realism is as much a mood as a set of doctrines. It reflects the experience,
felt on occasion by all who study the law, that the discourse of lawyers,
and the forms of legal reasoning, are often too musty, circumscribed, and
closed in upon themselves, and therefore inevitably fall out of touch with
social and political realities.
The second major tendency in twentieth-century American legal theory
was proceduralism. Indeed, proceduralism became the favored response to
what some considered the "nihilism" of legal realism. Like realism, it also
responded to the problems posed by the rise of the administrative state.
Proceduralism begins with the incontrovertible insight that legal disputes
often raise controversial questions of morality and policy. This is
particularly true of the sorts of problems faced by administrative agencies,
which took on increasingly elaborate tasks and extended the state's
influence in increasingly large areas of social life in the twentieth century.
If one cannot tell what the right answer should be on the merits, it is far
better, proceduralism teaches, to create a series of procedures through
which the legal system can settle the "right answer" for the purposes of the
legal system. Lawyers are particularly well suited to this task because
creating and following procedures are the lawyer's stock in trade. The
Legal Process School of the 1950s-identified particularly with Harvard,
31. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
(1995). Equally important debates about the rule of law had occurred in Europe in the late nineteenth-
and early twentieth-centuries, provoked by the rise of overt class-based politics, the development of
administrative welfare state, and the pressures of war. Albert Venn Dicey, a leading English
constitutional lawyer, bewailed what he viewed as the potential demise of the "rule of law" in the jaws
of the new administrative state. A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1st ed. 1885) (His views would later become influential in this country through
analogous arguments made by Frederich Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (1944). Even more
fundamental debates took place in Germany among Max Weber, Hans Kelsen, Carl Schmitt, and
Franz Neumann. See, e.g., WILLIAM SCHEURMAN, BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EXCEPTION: THE
FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1997). Although little of this debate filtered into the
American legal academy, it did influence a number of other disciplines in the United States. The
American attack on the pretensions of "the rule of law" was carried out almost exclusively by persons
linked with "progressive" politics and the defense of the New Deal and the administrative state. By
contrast, those attacking "the rule of law" in Europe were as likely to be right-wing authoritarians like
Schmitt as leftish progressives. Indeed, as Edward Purcell demonstrated some years ago, many
American legal realists became considerably chastened in the 1930s and 1940s, when attacks on "rule
of law" became identified with National Socialism and Communism. See EDWARD PURCELL, THE
CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973). This
did not necessarily mean, of course, that the critiques of "the rule of law" were genuinely overcome,
only that they were shunted aside in what tended to turn, especially in the 1950s, into a celebration of
the American legal order. The emergence of the civil rights movement in the 1960s and the Vietnam
War brought that celebration to an end, with the concomitant revival of American legal realism in the
form of what came to be called Critical Legal Studies.
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then almost certainly the dominant law school in the United States-
assimilated and co-opted elements of the realist critique32 and concluded
that the job of lawyers was not so much to decide what was right and
wrong but to determine which particular institution-legislature,
executive, administrator, or judge-should decide what was right and
wrong, and how they should go about deciding it. As a result, Legal
Process scholars spent a great deal of time thinking about questions like
the proper methods of statutory construction; the proper balance of power
between various branches of the federal government and between the
federal government and the states; how courts should assess the
procedural status of claims brought by litigants; how courts should review
the decisions of administrative agencies; and so on.
Proceduralism can be-and has been-ridiculed as a flight from
substance. It has been criticized for encouraging lawyers to focus
obsessively on formal niceties while avoiding or obscuring deeper
questions of substantive justice and thus fomenting ever new forms of
excuse for preserving the status quo. 3 Yet, at the same time,
proceduralism has its own normative commitments and its own ethics: a
belief in orderly deliberation, and a conviction that the legal system
functions best and gains the most political authority when it assigns
difficult and controversial decisions to the institutions or persons that are
most likely to have the necessary expertise or have the most legitimacy to
make a decision.
Realism and proceduralism are the two great legacies bequeathed by
American jurisprudence, and each responds to the other in a great
spiraling dialectic. Every important jurisprudential movement in the
United States-and most of the unimportant ones too-owes something to
this dialectic. Realism demands that lawyers look up from their procedural
fetishes and attend to the world as it is, with all its warts and injustices; it
seeks to throw open the curtains that cloak the musty halls of law and
bring in the light and fresh air of other disciplines so that law might better
reflect changing social realities and attitudes. Critical Legal Studies, legal
feminism and critical race theory, not surprisingly, all share the realist call
for law to awake from its dogmatic slumbers and attend to law's
complicity with social hierarchy. Proceduralism, on the other hand,
32. The key text, of course, is the famous compilation of materials by Henry Hart and Albert
Sachs, Legal Process, which, was offered only in a manuscript "tentative edition" in 1958 and was not
officially published until 1994. HENRY M. HART JR. AND ALBERT M. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994). On the intellectual milieu of legal process, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 251-66 (1995); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 247-68 (1992); Barry Friedman, The
Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112
YALE L.J. 153, 228-233, 241-47 (2002).
33. See, e.g., Garry Pellet, Neutral Principles in the 1950s', 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561
(1988); William N. Eskridge, Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945, 947-51, 962-66 (1989) (reviewing
ROBERT COVER, OWEN FISS AND JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988)).
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worries that making law too overtly political will endanger law's
legitimacy; it insists that the key to preserving values of democracy,
fairness, and the rule of law will come from cultivating questions of
procedure, even when these seem dry and abstract to the outside world.
Realism and proceduralism are not only America's gift to legal science;
they are also the features of American legal thought that most distinguish
it from the Civil Law tradition, which has tended to be far more formal in
its approach. To this day, most European lawyers-and many
professors-find American legal theory bizarre and almost the opposite of
truly "legal" reasoning. Americans are far less likely to delve deeply into
the intricacies of legal codes to figure out how each part fits with the
others. Instead, Americans ask what to the Civil Law mind are non-legal
questions like "What rule would be most efficient?" or "Given that people
will inevitably disagree about certain basic values, what procedures are
best suited to resolving disputes over such issues as abortion, affirmative
action, or the death penalty?"
What is particularly important for our purposes, however, is that
although realism (and, to a lesser extent, proceduralism) made law
increasingly interdisciplinary in its ambitions, neither necessarily brought
law closer to the study of the humanities. (The one major exception, of
course, is the continuation of the realist tradition in legal feminism, critical
race theory, and critical legal studies; each of these movements has drawn
from the work of philosophers, literary critics, and historians in the
humanities.) Indeed, both realism's fascination with facts and
proceduralism's attempt to harness the expertise necessary to run the
administrative state pushed law further and further away from the
humanist vision we see in Learned Hand's opening quotation and brought
it closer and closer to becoming a branch of policy science. In this respect
Holmes proved more prescient than his friend Hand. Legal realism and
legal process were much less likely to produce humanists and renaissance
persons than lawyer-economists and technocrats. This spawned yet
another set of reactions by those who felt, and continue to feel, that law
has lost a good deal of its humanity and its humaneness; these scholars
have sought to reconnect the study and the practice of law to what they
regard as humanist ideals. This tendency cuts across ideological divisions
and the many different movements in the American legal academy. It can
be found in the "critique of rights" offered by some adherents of Critical
Legal Studies, in the works of the "law and literature" movement that
seeks to think about law in humanist terms, and in Anthony Kronman's
The Lost Lawyer, which decries the soulless practice of corporate law and
the equally soulless calculations of contemporary law and economics
scholarship. 34 The urge to recover humanism--often identified, whether
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correctly or incorrectly, with what people in humanities departments are
actually doing these days-is one species of response to the American law
school's technocratic tendencies.
IV. LAW'S RESISTANCE TO COLONIZATION
Although it is impossible to understand contemporary legal theory
without recognizing its strongly interdisciplinary character, law has a most
curious relationship to interdisciplinarity. Law seems endlessly to poach
upon other disciplines and absorb many of their insights while still
remaining law. Conversely, many disciplines have tried to invade and
colonize law over the years, yet the legal academy still continues to
produce legal scholarship that asks recognizably traditional sorts of legal
questions. For example, arguments about what judges should do in
particular cases, what legal rules should be created, and how legal texts
and doctrines should be interpreted still dominate the field. What explains
law's ability to take in outside intellectual influences without being
drastically altered, to absorb the successive invasions of other fields of
research in what we might call a sort of intellectual rope-a-dope?
The reason is the institutional context in which law is taught: the modem
professional school.35 The vast majority of legal academics are trained in
and teach in professional schools whose primary business is training
lawyers who will go out and practice law and make legal arguments
before judges, legislatures, and administrative agencies. This institutional
context continually reorients legal scholarship back toward its professional
origins and, many might say, its professional obligations. Thus, at the end
of the day, no matter how interested legal scholars may be in Derrida,
rational actor theories, or Herman Melville, they have to return to the
classroom and teach J.D. students to become lawyers. The Yale Law
School, where both of us have taught, is perhaps the closest to a traditional
graduate program, but even at Yale the overwhelming percentage of
students do not intend to become legal scholars.36 Some of them, to be
sure, will become novelists, politicians, and investment bankers, but most
of them will become lawyers, and, in particular, corporate lawyers. At
other schools the percentages are no doubt even higher. This fact
distinguishes graduate education in law from graduate education in most
areas of the humanities. Relatively few law students, even at the elite
schools, actually wish to emulate their professors by becoming academics
themselves.37 It would be a strange graduate program in the humanities
35. For a more detailed argument, see J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 949, 965-70 (1996).
36. As a rough proxy, the Yale Law School placement office reports that out of 12,137 living
Yale Law School graduates, 1,017 (or approximately 8.4 percent) are members of faculties that belong
to the Association of American Law Schools (AALS). E-mail from Pamela Sims, Alumni Affairs
Coordinator, Yale Law School, to Jack M. Balkin (June 28, 2006) (on file with Balkin).
37. Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955
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that was populated by Ph.D. candidates with no interest at all in a
scholarly career. Not so the average J.D. student.
In law schools, almost all of the students do not want to grow up to be
like their professors, and almost all of the law professors have consciously
chosen not to become practicing lawyers. This creates occasional mutual
incomprehension between students and teachers. Similar tensions
sometimes surface between the academy and the profession when legal
scholarship strays too far from the familiar work of offering expert advice
and advocacy on contemporary legal questions for the benefit of the bench
and bar. Until the 1970s, offering such advice was the standard practice of
law professors, and their legal scholarship viewed judges-and especially
Supreme Court Justices-as their ideal readers. The legal profession
honors legal academics who continue this practice, but displays
considerably less esteem for the increasing number of legal academics
whose work strays too far from this paradigm.
Indeed, members of the bench and bar are not shy in saying so. For
example, a decade ago Judge Harry Edwards of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, himself a former legal academic, complained of
the "growing disjunction" between what law professors write in scholarly
journals and what lawyers and judges expect from them. 38 Legal
academics have become less like their colleagues in the bench and bar,
and more like their colleagues in the rest of the university. Increasingly,
they write about things likely to interest their academic colleagues at peer
institutions. Conversely, judges are far less likely to read academic
articles, which, of course, simply generates ever less incentive for
academics to imagine judges as their intended audience. Yet despite
Edwards' qualms, basic features of American legal education-including
the fact that most law students are destined for the profession and not the
academy-continuously reorient the study of law back towards a set of
traditional professional concerns. If this were not so, the disjunction
Edwards complains of would be far greater than it is.
V. LAW'S PRESCRIPTIVISM
The second key reason why law resists complete invasion by any other
discipline is that law's professional orientation produces a curious kind of
normative attitude that is quite different from the normativity that appears
in many parts of the humanities. By normativity, we mean simply the way
that persons within a discipline take normative positions, and the kinds of
(1981).
38. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). For a response to Edwards, see Sanford Levinson, Judge
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normative claims that they are expected to make.39 In law, the form that
normativity takes is quite narrow.4° We might call it prescriptivism-the
demand that each piece of scholarship offer some account, however
nebulous, of the stakes for how the law should be modified or interpreted
or how legal decisionmakers should do their jobs. This prescriptivism has
a daunting effect on scholars who would seek to avoid it, for their
colleagues (and their own interior dialogues) continually insist that all
interdisciplinary work be cashed out in prescriptive terms. 41 "Now that
you've told me about Deleuze and Guattari," a colleague will say, "what
does this have to do with telecommunications law?" The demand that
legal scholarship be cashed out in policy prescriptions deeply
circumscribes the legal imagination and the permissible boundaries of
legal scholarship, while simultaneously reorienting legal scholarship
towards legal practice and policy science.
We do not wish to exaggerate. Much legal scholarship today is barely
distinguishable from political theory or economic modeling. But such
analysis, however distant from legal doctrine it may appear, is always
understood to have consequences for either the legitimacy or the reform of
existing legal institutions. Even though legal scholars, have, over the
years, rebelled against the prescriptivism of the legal academy in countless
ways, they are continually drawn into the gravitational orbit of law's
normativity, which, in turn, reflects law's orientation to legal practice.
When scholars seek to treat law as a cultural or aesthetic object, much as
one might do in art history, their colleagues in the academy inevitably
want to know how the work furthers debates about the choice and
interpretation of legal norms. If a scholar responds that he or she had no
intention of doing anything of the sort, the work is likely to be judged
irrelevant or "not law."
Legal philosophy and legal history are exempted from this demand, but
only because their work is generally viewed as auxiliary to law's
normativity. Legal philosophy helps legitimate the legal system and
clarifies its basic concepts, while legal history provides useful data for
39. The idea of "normativity" is premised on the fact that there are many different ways to take a
normative position, and many different aesthetics and styles for doing so. For example, one can make
normative claims through criticism of the status quo without offering alternatives or through positive
proposals for reform; and proposals for reform, in turn, can be directed at improving institutions or
conventions, or at individual or group self-awareness or self-improvement. One can criticize (or
praise) a person, a practice, a cultural tradition, or an institution. One can work on showing
contradiction or inadequacy in reasoning, attempt to demonstrate bad faith, impure motives, self-
delusion or hypocrisy, or focus on bad consequences. One can offer normative judgments directly or
make them indirectly through comparative or historical study. Finally, some disciplines and practices
insist that they are interested solely in description so that people within them must take normative
positions through implication and stealth.
40. The critique of law's particular normative stance has been made most ably by Pierre Schlag.
See PAUL F. CAMPOS, PIERRE SCHLAG & STEVEN D. SMITH, AGAINST THE LAW (1996); PIERRE
SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND (1996).
41. See Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2053, 2055-58 (1993); Pierre Schlag,
Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801, 808-815 (1991).
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making normative legal and policy arguments. Whether philosophers and
historians would accept these characterizations of the importance of their
work is irrelevant; the point is that they are valuable to others in the legal
academy because of their relationship to a legal academy dominated by
prescriptivism.
As we have noted, law's normativity is produced by the institutional
context in which law professors teach and work. And it continually pushes
legal scholars back towards some form of internalism. This influence is
pervasive both in the classroom and in recruitment of new scholars. The
standard-form job talk for those seeking entry into the legal academy
continues to include, as its conclusion, the implications of the presenter's
argument for the solution of some contemporary legal issue.42 Although
legal historians are treated somewhat differently, since their job is
primarily to account for historical developments in law, there is
continuous-albeit sometimes unacknowledged-pressure for legal
historians to write history in presentist terms or to use their historical work
to show that a current line of existing law has taken a wrong path.
What then, if a legal scholar adopts a forthrightly "externalist" stance
and declares that law schools should be less like seminaries teaching the
dogmas of a particular faith-in this case faith in "the law"-and more
like departments of religion where professors can be genuinely interested
in the phenomena of "the law" but lack any particular faith in it?43 Most
law students, members of the bench, and members of the bar would be
unhappy with such a development precisely because it would signify
abandonment of the professional and internalist enterprise that takes legal
analysis on its own terms with consummate seriousness. Indeed, it is
overdetermined that at most law schools externalism will be welcomed so
long as it furthers the general enterprise of law (that is, that the work falls
into Box 2). Most law schools, we suspect, will ensure that legal scholars
who are extemalist in their attitudes as well as in the knowledge they
employ (that is, those scholars who fall into Box 3) will be kept in their
place-tolerated, as it were, but not allowed to dominate or set the
scholarly agenda, so that law schools may continue to present themselves
as non-apostate members of the community of legal faith. State-supported
law schools in particular might face the possibility of political retaliation
should they publicly abandon their traditional roles and self-conceptions in
significant measure, and even most private schools would have to consider
the loss of financial support from their alumni.44
42. It would be interesting to compare the relative weight of"job talks" in the legal academy with
departments in the arts and sciences. One factor accounting for the very high (often inordinate) weight
placed on such talks in law schools is that, at least until recently, most job candidates had in fact
written quite little that one could actually read and evaluate. (This is changing, however, especially as
more applicants have in fact written dissertations or published articles.)
43. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 155-179 (1988).
44. We use the word "publicly" because, of course, some scholars at law schools have effectively
abandoned internalist and professional self-conceptions, moving, in effect, from Box 2 to Box 3. But
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A few years ago, one of us (Balkin) had a conversation with Austin
Sarat, a key figure in the Law and Society movement and, along with
Balkin, one of the founders of the Association for the Study of Law,
Culture, and the Humanities. Given Balkin's undoubted interest in the
study of law as a cultural phenomenon, Sarat asked, why didn't he join
Sarat and found a Ph.D. program in law that would escape the constricted
agendas that professional schools of law generally impose? Balkin gave
his answer in a single word: "Xeroxing," by which he meant that because
he worked at a richly endowed professional school, he got all his xeroxing
for free, while Sarat still had to purchase copy cards. The tax professor
down the hall, Balkin explained, subsidized his scholarship on law and
post-structuralism. A law department that cut itself off from the goal of
professional education would soon find itself as well supported financially
as the average art history or music department, which is to say, it would
not be very well supported at all.
The moral of this story is that although "humanists," however defined,
may be welcomed into the company of professional legal scholars, they
are welcomed with the understanding that the humanities are not central to
the legal academy's future. One sometimes sees at elite law schools
seminars on subjects that would not be amiss in humanities departments,
but these seminars are made possible because most law professors
continue to teach the traditional skills of legal analysis and argument with
their strongly prescriptive orientation. The humanities, rather than
something that the law celebrates, as Learned Hand imagined, are
something that the law enjoys as long as it can afford them.
VI. THE RHETORICAL DEMANDS OF LAW
There is, however, an important feature of professional legal education
that has a strong connection to the humanities, at least as classically
conceived: rhetoric. Simply put, lawyers are rhetors. They make
arguments to convince other people. They deal in persuasion. Practicing
lawyers represent clients, and they make arguments that support their
client's interests. They do not actually have to believe what they say;
rather, they need to produce arguments that their audience will believe. To
that end, they will borrow from any source and from any species of
learning they can to construct arguments that will persuade their audience
and help their client win.
most law schools certainly do not advertise this fact; rather, interdisciplinary scholarship is often sold
to alumni as a particularly valuable example of Box 2-a prestige item that helps further the discovery
and promotion of professionally useful knowledge. A school's interdisciplinary aspirations-and
increasingly its international ones-are signs that the school is up to date and can attract the finest
scholars. As a result, interdisciplinarity burnishes the school's status in the pecking order and helps
preserve the value of the alumni's degrees. Establishing and preserving the professional status and
accreditation of their students' law school degrees, is, after all, one of the major functions of American
law schools; thus we can rest assured that no law school dean in his or her right mind would
jeopardize that hallowed goal by publicly turning the law school's back on its professional aspirations.
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Although legal scholars do not have clients, this rhetorical orientation
carries over to legal scholarship. Much legal scholarship aims to persuade
other people about what legal rule or legal interpretation to adopt. As we
have noted, this follows from law's narrow version of normativity-the
notion that contributions to legal scholarship are judged in terms of how
they might promote prescriptive solutions to legal problems.
Lawyers' roles as rhetors would seem to make them natural allies of the
humanities. After all, rhetoric was one of the central subjects of the
humanities for many years, and the work that practicing lawyers do today
still has much in common with the lessons of classical rhetoric taught
centuries ago in the great humanist academies of Ancient Greece and
Rome. 4" It is no accident that the author of The New Rhetoric, Chaim
Perleman,46 was also a legal theorist, or that the literary critic Stanley Fish
has more recently taken delight in studying-and manipulating-the
rhetorical tropes of contemporary American legal theory.
Ironically, though, law's very foundations in rhetoric also limit its
absorption of other disciplines in the humanities. Interdisciplinarity has
made gains in law to the extent that it has allowed lawyers and legal
scholars to do what they had already been doing-making persuasive
arguments for the justification, change or interpretation of legal norms.
This means, first, that lawyers are more likely to embrace disciplines that
produce facts or bestow authority on facts that lawyers can use to impress
others and persuade them. Other than history, the disciplines of the
humanities have proven less useful for this purpose in recent years than
have the social and natural sciences. Second, it means that when lawyers
adopt knowledge and skills from other disciplines, the latter must be
altered (some would say simplified or distorted) for the purpose of
lawyerly persuasion. In short, legal scholarship borrows and transforms
what it receives from other disciplines and converts it into persuasive
arguments about legal norms. That which cannot be so used is disfavored,
forgotten, or transformed until it can be so employed. When it comes to
interdisciplinarity, law is truly the Procrustean bed. It welcomes visiting
disciplines to serve its own ends, and then cuts or stretches their work to
fit law's normative template.
We have already noted one consequence of law's incessant habits of
borrowing: dilettantism. A second is perversion or prostitution: the subtle
reorientation of the goals of humanities scholarship as it makes its way
into law schools to serve the rhetorical interests and objectives of lawyers.
History provides an excellent example. Most historians, at least in the
current generation, are interested in complexity; they endeavor to
understand the complicated and contingent events that produce a world.
45. See J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of
Legal Reason, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 211, 211-14 (Peter Brooks
& Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
46. CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (1969).
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Lawyers are not interested in complexity in the same way. Devoted to
making persuasive arguments on behalf of particular normative positions,
lawyers are prone to say, "Because of what Madison said in this debate,
we know that the Second Amendment's right to bear arms is a personal
right. Therefore federal regulation on handguns is unconstitutional."
Similarly, lawyers on the other side of the gun control controversy will
reply that Madison's comment in another debate demonstrates that he was
interested in protecting only the rights of states to form militias of their
own. Therefore, they will argue, federal control of private handguns is
perfectly constitutional. For lawyers, the value of history is instrumental.
Lawyers use history to make firm and authoritative pronouncements about
what the law means, and different lawyers seek to do this on opposite
sides of a disputed legal issue using whatever historical evidence they can
find. This is the sort of approach to history that makes professional
historians blanch. "Not surprisingly, legal historians who work in areas
with some relevance to present day policy debates often find themselves
caught between two disciplinary worlds. Law does this to history (and to
every other discipline, we might add) because of its professional
orientation.
In their quest for persuasive arguments, lawyers are always in search of
authority that they can use to convince judges, juries, legislatures,
administrative agencies, and other legal decisionmakers of the merits of
their positions. Lawyers seek two basic sources of authority: the authority
of legitimate power, on the one hand, and the authority of right reason on
the other. The first source of authority includes past acts of power that
possess political legitimacy, such as the statements of legislators in
considering a bill, or contextual information about a historical moment
that helps to explain the meaning of past political and legal acts. The
second source of authority involves knowledge and expertise that establish
that one position is more normatively justifiable than another.
47. As Daniel Hulseboch explains:
[Clonstitutional law studies and history are separate disciplines. Typically, historians and legal
scholars are trained separately, publish in different journals, and contribute to distinct
conversations. When they encounter each other in the same venue it becomes clear that they
value different sources, ask different questions of those sources, and apply different measures of
fitness to interpret them. Criticism usually comes from historians, who scoff at "law office
history," which they see as instrumentalist and blinkered.
Daniel Hulseboch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 664 (2005). There is a lively
debate on how lawyers use (or misuse history). For a sampling, see Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite"
in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Eric Foner, The Supreme
Court's Legal History, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 243 (1992); Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections On
The Turn To History In Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (1997); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and
the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965); William E. Nelson, History and
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1986); John Phillip Reid, Law and
History, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 193, 203 (1993); Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment
of the Supreme Court's Uses of History, 13 J. L. & POLITICS 809 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of
a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601 (1995); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship:
The Case of History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909 (1996).
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Inevitably, lawyers, judges, and legal scholars are drawn to use what
they borrow from the humanities or the social sciences as means of
producing authority. If the work of a discipline does not enhance the
ability to persuade or establish authority, it will be discarded, or, in the
alternative, it will be recrafted so that it does help serve that function. In
this way complicated historical and economic studies are often reduced to
footnotes at the base of a lawyer's brief, laying cheek by jowl with cases,
statutes, and other forms of legal authority. (They will even appear in the
index to the lawyer's brief as part of the "Table of Authorities"). Even
though law repeatedly invokes history, the historical world perceived by
most lawyers is quite different from that perceived by most professional
historians. Historians are far less likely to draw confident conclusions
from complicated and multi-layered historical materials, which often
feature conflicting accounts and have the potential to support multiple
interpretations.
Philosophy provides another example of how law makes use of other
disciplines. During the twentieth century the status of philosophy has
tended to rise in the legal academy to the extent that legal scholars could
employ the authority of philosophical arguments to promote particular
legal positions. For example, in 1969, when the Supreme Court was still
experimenting with constitutional protections for welfare rights, Frank
Michelman used John Rawls' ideas to argue that the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed minimum levels of assistance to the poor.
However, as the political climate changed and the judiciary grew
increasingly conservative, legal scholars lost interest in Michelman's
Rawlsian project, not because it was philosophically unworthy but
because it fit poorly with the evolving canon of legal materials. With
typical wit, John Hart Ely deflated the turn toward philosophy by
imagining a Supreme Court that declared, "We like Rawls, you like
Nozick. We win 6-3."'4
Indeed, philosophers may be surprised to learn that in American law
schools Richard Rorty and Thomas Kuhn may have been every bit as
influential as John Rawls in the late twentieth century. Rorty's
antifoundationalism and Kuhn's theory of paradigm shifts in scientific
research resonated with feminist and critical legal scholars who wanted to
debunk law's claims to neutrality and objectivity; legal pragmatists, on the
other hand, tried to show how these philosophers demonstrated the value
of traditional legal methods.
Ronald Dworkin's work helped to generate an extremely fruitful
conversation between law professors and political philosophers in the
1970s and 1980s. Once again, however, the legal academy tended to value
48. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, October 1968 Term: Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
49. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 58 (1973).
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philosophy to the extent that it focused on topics that lawyers were
otherwise interested in, like the nature and scope of constitutional rights,
the moral justifications for the economic approach to law, the legitimacy
of judicial review, or the proper methods of constitutional interpretation.
As liberal legal scholars gradually realized that the Warren Court was
never coming back, and as law and economics established itself as a
dominant method, the conversation between legal theory and philosophy
died down. Professionally trained legal philosophers increasingly turned to
highly technical topics that most legal theorists find of little relevance to
their own work, while an increasingly conservative judiciary made grand
philosophical arguments for liberal judicial activism and new fundamental
rights seem quaint and altogether beside the point. By the mid-1990s,
Dworkin himself argued that not even Hercules-Dworkin's name for his
"ideal" judge-could legitimately find Michelman's theory of rights for
the poor in the U.S. Constitution even though it was what liberal political
theory required.5 °
If law absorbs the work of other disciplines to the extent that they assist
lawyers with their quest for persuasion and authority, what disciplines
have proved most useful to legal scholars? It turns out that there have been
three of them, and it is fairly easy to see how each of them is well suited to
producing rhetorical authority in debates about law and public policy. The
first is economics, and all forms of rational actor theory generally. These
are useful because they offer predictions about what human beings will do
in certain situations, and thus what the consequences of any policy will be.
Indeed, the wonderful thing about economic concepts is that they can
often be employed to argue both sides of an issue, precisely the sort of tool
that any good rhetor needs. Economics is also valuable because it offers a
normative criterion-economic efficiency-that can be used as a general
purpose substitute for other goals of the legal system. And, finally,
economics is valuable because it proclaims itself the most scientific of the
social sciences, and thus more easily allows lawyers to claim scientific
status for their arguments, whether deserved or not. The second discipline
is history, because history explains the meaning of past events, making it
particularly useful for offering appeals to past decisions and traditions.
The third discipline is philosophy, because philosophy supplies methods
for appealing to right reason, and methods of explaining and justifying
both legal concepts and the legal system.
These three-economics, history, and philosophy-have had more
influence in legal scholarship than any other disciplines precisely because
the skills, techniques, and knowledges they provide are most easily
adapted to the forms of legal argument and legal scholarship that already
existed prior to their entry. They are used by lawyers and legal scholars
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because they are most useful to them. And if one looks at the doctoral
degrees of law professors who do interdisciplinary work, they are
disproportionately in these three areas.
Why did sociology, psychology, literary theory, and anthropology not
achieve the same status? One can easily imagine how these fields might be
useful to lawyers' demands for normativity, persuasion, and authority.
And indeed, psychology, which actually made some inroads at an earlier
time, is now the most likely to join the ranks of the big three.
Nevertheless, in terms of what lawyers and legal scholars do, these
disciplines have-at least so far-proved least useful in making
persuasive arguments and appeals to authority.
VII. LAW AND LITERATURE
No doubt many readers are aware of the presence over the past thirty
years of a "law and literature" movement within the legal academy.51 In
fact, the so-called "law and literature" movement has always had at least
two distinct strains. Robert Weisberg wrote a classic article in the first
issue of the Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities in 1988,
distinguishing between a focus on "the law in literature" and a quite
different focus on the "law as literature."52 The first approach is perhaps
best typified by those professors who write about Melville's Billy Budd,
which, with its dramatic encounter of the (alleged) claims of law against
the competing claims of morality, is surely the most widely taught piece of
literature in the American law school.53 The second approach is typified by
those scholars, including ourselves, " who were far less interested in
discussing Billy Budd or Franz Kafka than with mining the writings of
various literary theorists (such as Jacques Derrida or Stanley Fish) for the
insights they might provide about the rhetorical devices employed in law,
the way legal rhetoric constructed and concealed political power and
authority, and the proper methods of legal interpretation. The "law as
literature" branch also drew on a host of anti-foundational philosophers
and thinkers ranging from Friedrich Nietzsche to Richard Rorty.
Most of the persons interested in "law in literature" accept the classic
humanistic notion that one is morally improved by encounters with great
51. The movement began more or less with the publication in 1973 of The Legal Imagination by
James Boyd White. JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF
LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973). Another important figure is Richard Weisberg, who was
instrumental in founding the Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature, now published at Berkeley as the
Journal of Law and Literature.
52. Robert H. Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, I YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1988).
53. In The Failure of the Word, Richard Weisberg argues that Captain Vere in fact misstates the
relevant British law and that Melville expected his more sophisticated readers to know that this was
the case. RICHARD WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN
MODERN FICTION (1984).
54. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Law As Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373-403 (1982); J.M.
Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 97 YALE L. J. 743 (1987).
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art. James Boyd White has explicitly (even if, to our minds, rather
implausibly) argued that truly "great" art has always conveyed admirable
moral notions.55 Perhaps not surprisingly, sustaining this position has
produced significant disputes about the "real meaning" of such "great"
works as The Merchant of Venice, with Richard Weisberg, for example,
claiming that it is best understood as a critique of anti-Semitism rather
than an illustration of the phenomenon. 56 Judge Richard Posner, by
contrast, has rejected the claim that confronting questions of law and
justice in great works of literature can edify and enlighten law students
and legal practitioners.57 Posner sees himself as a contemporary disciple of
Holmes, sharing not only Holmes's acid skepticism about the claims of
moral philosophers,58 but also Holmes's esteem for economics as the
guiding star for legal analysis. Posner has heaped scorn on the idea that
the study of law and literature can improve anyone or, for that matter,
provide significant illumination even as to the hermeneutics of legal
analysis.
Both of us have, in the past, argued that "law as literature" is a more
fruitful way to bring the insights of the humanities into legal scholarship
than law in literature. More recently, we have argued that an even better
analogy to law than poems and novels can be drawn from the performing
arts such as music and drama. As we have elaborated elsewhere,59 what
these share with law is that they feature texts of some sort-think of
scores, scripts, as well as constitutions, statutes, and regulations-and that
these texts must be brought to life by performers. The performing arts
involve a triangle of creators, interpreters, and audiences, each of which
shapes what we call a successful or unsuccessful performance.60 Indeed,
"performance" involves not isolated individuals, but elaborate social
networks that provide for the training and disciplining of performers-
such as conservatories, drama schools, and law schools-as well as the
panoply of different types of audiences and critics that shape the reception
and production of musical, dramatic, and legal performances.
Nevertheless, however much we might hope that "law and literature" and,
indeed, "law and the performing arts," might have a vital presence in the
legal academy, we doubt they will rival the interdisciplinary influence of
economics and history in the long run. Our central argument, after all, is
55. See Sanford Levinson, Conversing About Justice, 100 YALE L.J.1855 (1991) (reviewing
JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE IN TRANSLATION (1990).
56. RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 94-103
(1992).
57. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 306, 387-88 (rev. ed. 1998) ("Immersion in
literature does not make us better citizens or better people.").
58. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999).
59. Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1597 (1991); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music: Performance Notes on
"The Banjo Serenader" and "The Lying Crowd of Jews, " 20 CARDOzO L. REv. 1513 (1999).
60. Balkin & Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music, supra note 59, at 1529-153 1.
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that the success of interdisciplinary studies in law is strongly shaped by
the professional orientation of law schools and the prescriptive nature of
legal normativity. Those interdisciplinary studies will fare best that adapt
themselves best to this institutional (and rhetorical) environment.
Precisely because law is a professional field devoted to rhetorical
persuasion, it will never be fully taken over by any other disciplines,
whether they be social sciences like economics and sociology, or
humanistic subjects like history, philosophy or literary criticism.61 Rather,
law will co-opt the insights of those disciplines and turn them to its own
uses. Yet ironically, law's thoroughly rhetorical nature, which most
strongly connects it to the traditions of the humanities, also places the
contemporary disciplines of the humanities at a relative disadvantage in
legal scholarship. Law uses rhetoric to establish its authority and to
legitimate particular acts of legal and political power. Nowadays, those
tasks increasingly require legal scholars to adopt technocratic forms of
discourse that draw more on the social and natural sciences than on the
humanities. Lawyers are rhetorical opportunists and pragmatists: They are
always looking for new ways to impress and persuade their audiences, and
to bestow authority and legitimacy on themselves and on the institutions
and practices they seek to defend. Whether justly or unjustly, the
humanities rise or fall in relation to other disciplines to the extent that the
humanities help lawyers perform these rhetorical tasks.
VIII. THE FATE OF THE HUMANITIES IN LAW
There has always been something puzzling about law's encounter with
the humanities. Learned Hand (or James Boyd White) might wax eloquent
about what lawyers can learn from the great humanists of the past and
about how the humanities can enrich the lawyer's moral imagination, but
these hopes must confront the harsh reality that there has always been a
dehumanizing tendency in legal education. Legal education, and hence
legal scholarship, tends to promote the tough-minded values that William
James once famously described rather than the tender-minded ones. 61
Indeed, law seems almost to relish the extirpation of the latter, as if tender-
heartedness were a mental disease that only the discipline of law could
cure. The traditional first year of legal education discourages
sentimentality; it is designed to show, as the poor and defenseless are
caught in the web of legal doctrines in case after case, that these doctrines
have their own logic; so to simply bemoan the results as unjust is no
argument. A "good lawyer" is a rigorous thinker who does not waste time
denouncing injustice at the expense of legal analysis. It is only the
insufficiently rigorous and well-trained, whom legal training has
inadequately "disciplined," who think that the solution to a legal problem
61. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, supra note 35, at 965-67.
62. See WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 7-21 (Bruce Kuklick ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1981) (1907).
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is resolved by asking which result is more just. Even scholars who believe
it important to emphasize issues of justice are careful to instill analytical
rigor and skepticism in their charges. They too, seek to distinguish what is
law from what is right.
The aggressiveness and unsentimentality of legal education, many think,
has real consequences in the later careers of those trained in American law
schools. A debate now raging through the legal academy concerns the
work of Justice Department lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel,
several of them drawn from the highest reaches of the elite legal academy,
who drafted memoranda for the Bush Administration that narrowly and
legalistically defined "torture" so that it could be said that American
soldiers and CIA operatives were not perpetrating it. 63 These same
memoranda forcefully argued that the President as Commander-in-Chief
had virtually absolute powers to conduct warfare; therefore neither
Congressional statutes nor international agreements barring torture could
restrict his authority. Legal academics have debated whether these lawyers
were simply doing their professional duty by representing their clients, or,
on the contrary, were betraying their professional commitments in the
deepest sense.
Here it is useful to return to Oliver Wendell Holmes, that most iconic of
figures in American law. Holmes once suggested that his epitaph should
read: "Here lies a supple tool of power."' He once wrote to Harold Laski,
"If my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job."6 5
Once when Learned Hand shouted to Holmes as they were departing
company, "Well, sir, good-bye. Do justice." Holmes sharply replied, "That
is not my job. My job is to play the game according to the rules."6 6 One
wonders whether Holmes would have been at all shocked by the Office of
Legal Counsel's "torture" memos or would have seen them simply as
quotidian examples of lawyers' stock in trade-coming up with arguments
to justify whatever their clients would like to do. One equally wonders
whether Hand would have been taken aback by these memos, and whether
he seriously believed that exposure to the works of Plato, Montaigne, or
any of the other authors he mentioned in the quotation that opens this
essay would have prevented these memos, or, at the very least, led their
63. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attomey General, Department of Justice Office
of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801 .pdf
(discussing the application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340(A) (2000). See generally Dana Priest & R.
Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture; Justice Dept. Gave Advice in 2002,
WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at Al.
64. Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 249-50 (1964) (quoting
Holmes).
65. Letter from Oliver Wendell Homes to Harold J. Laski (March 4, 1920) in I HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916-1935, at 249
(Mark DeWolfe ed., 1953).
66. HARRY C. SHRIVER, WHAT GUSTO: STORIES AND ANECDOTES ABOUT JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 10 (1970).
2006]
31
Balkin and Levinson: Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
authors to leaven their lawyerly arguments with greater moral concern.
Holmes was a notably well-read man, but we have little doubt that he
would have scoffed at any idea that reading literature or engaging in the
humanities would have the edificatory effect that Learned Hand seemed to
advocate. He probably would have insisted that acquaintance with Homer
and Shakespeare would not have changed what ambitious young lawyers
in the Office of Legal Counsel wrote to please those in power. Even a
torturer can love a sonnet or, as we learned during World War II, even a
Nazi can thrill to Wilhelm Furtwangler conducting Beethoven.
Nor should we discount the extent to which Hand's admonition to study
the humanities may have been generated, at least in part, by a sort of
cultural elitism, in particular, his concerns about the ambitious, grasping
parvenus who were invading the legal profession of his day. For Hand and
for many of the people in his Philadelphia audience, submersion in the
humanities might have been a way of defending the values of the
traditional legal establishment. (There is an obvious analogy to the
development of English literature as an academic subject in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries to civilize the children of working men who were
entering British universities for the first time.67)
The political meaning of promoting the humanities in law has changed
in half a century, and along with it the power and influence of the
humanities themselves. Hand wrote when the humanities formed the deep
roots of an imagined republic of letters in which elite lawyers believed
they participated. Contemporary legal scholars like James Boyd White and
Patricia Williams use the humanities not to uphold the values of the legal
establishment, but rather to criticize those values in the name of more
egalitarian sensibilities which they (correctly or incorrectly) link to a
humanist approach. Contemporary law and literature scholars now offer
the humanities as an antidote to, or an escape from, a legal world which,
they believe, has become all too technocratic and divorced from any
human values save economic efficiency.
Does this mean that the humanities have been thoroughly routed by the
forces of social science and rational actor methodologies, so that they no
longer play a significant role in the legal academy or the legal profession?
Certainly not. The influence of the humanities will be filtered through
law's professionalism and prescriptivism, and hemmed in by law's
institutional constraints; yet the law will always maintain a genuine if
uneasy relationship with the humanities as long as it remains a thoroughly
rhetorical enterprise. Whether this kind of relationship will-or should-
satisfy those humanists who gaze on the legal academy from the outside
remains an open question.
67. See TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 25 (1983).
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